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Introduction 
As its title indicates, my book-Mystifying Movies: Fads and 
Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory-rejects a great many of the 
presuppositions of the cinema studies establishment in the United 
States and Britain today. Moreover, since the British journal Screen 
was the source of many of those presuppositions, it is not surprising 
that it published a scathing response to Mystifying Movies. That 
response took the form of a substantial article by Warren Buckland 
entitled "Critique of Poor Reason." 
Screen sent neither me nor my publisher a copy of this review 
article. I came across it over a year after its publication date. I 
wrote to Screen requesting an author's right to refute 
Buckland's charges in an article of comparable length. Screen 
suggested that I write a five-page letter to the editor, or, if I wanted 
to write an article, that it connect my dispute with Buckland to 
larger methodological issues in the debate between psychoanalytic 
film theory and my view, which is sometimes called cognitivism. 
The following article was my attempt to implement the second 
option. 
Screen rejected the article. Whether Screen rejected it as a 
result of a judgment that it does not sufficiently address 
significant methodological issues or as an attempt to repress 
alternative voices in the predictably Stalinist manner of Lysenko is 
a question for the reader to resolve. . . . 
Noël Carroll is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and author 
of Philosophical Classical Film Theory, Mystifying Movies, and Philosophy of Horror. 
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Throughout the eighties, albeit in fits and starts, there was an attempt, by 
people like myself and David Bordwell,1 to field an approach to film theory 
that offers an alternative to the psychoanalytic-marxist-semiotic theory which 
has been disseminated most notably by Screen and which is, especially when 
amplified by Lacanian feminism, the dominant approach to film theory in the 
English-speaking world today. This alternative approach has been labeled 
"cognitivism" because of the emphasis that it places on the efficacy of models 
that exploit the role of cognitive processes, as opposed to unconscious 
processes, in the explanation of cinematic communication and understanding. 
Cognitivism is not a unified theory in three senses. First, it is not a single 
theory, but a series of small-scale theories, each of which offers answers to 
specific questions about film communication, e.g., how do audiences assimilate 
film narratives? Second, it is not a unified theory because different cognitivist 
theorists often present small-scale theories that conceptualize the phenomena 
at hand differently and, sometimes, in nonconverging ways. And 
finally, cognitivism seems not to be a unified theory because, partly due to the 
previous two considerations, we have no reason to believe that all the small-
scale theories that the cognitivists have assembled can be organized into a 
single framework. 
On the other hand, though cognitivism is not a theory, its proponents 
share certain convictions, such as: that cognitive models may provide better 
answers to many of the theoretical questions we have about film than 
psychoanalytic models do; that film theory is a mode of rational enquiry and, 
as such, is assessable according to our best standards of reasoning and 
evidence; and that theories are evaluated comparatively, e.g., psychoanalytic 
theories must be put in competition with cognitive theories that propose to 
explain the same data (like narrative comprehension). Furthermore, 
some cognitivists-most notoriously myself-have argued that once the reigning 
psychoanalytic-marxist theory is assessed according to canons of rational 
enquiry and compared to alternative cognitive theories, it appears baroque and 
vacuous, indeed, altogether an intellectual disaster. 
Predictably, cognitivism has evoked the ire of the cinema studies 
establishment.2 Not only does cognitivism challenge the foundations of that 
establishment's paradigm, but it also emerges at a time when it is evident that 
that paradigm is producing routine, rather than interesting, new results. And 
it is a commonplace that researchers are apt to abandon a theory when it 
ceases to provide innovative discoveries. Thus, it should come as no surprise 
that we are beginning to encounter a number of what might be thought of as 
"damage control" articles which are dedicated to the refutation of cognitivism 
and/or to establishing its compatibility with the dominant psychoanalytic model 
(the new pluralism). 
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One of the most interesting of these articles-because it is the most 
sustained as well as the most methodologically ambitious-is Warren 
Buckland's recent attack, published in Screen, of my book Mystifying Movies? 
In what follows, I wish to respond to Buckland's attack in detail. But, more 
importantly, I would like to address a series of deep methodological issues that 
his attack raises which are pertinent to any future debates between cognitivism 
and the ruling psychoanalytic-marxist theory. Thus, though this article is, in 
part, a reaction to Buckland, it is also an attempt to clarify what I take to be 
some of the most important methodological issues between cognitivists and 
psychoanalytic-marxists. 
Science Bashing 
Buckland, like others, fears that cognitivism, at least under my construal, 
puts too much faith in scientific method (and analytic philosophy). It is true 
that I regard scientific method as a useful guide to the sort of rational enquiry 
that film theorists pursue. But Buckland seems to think that I believe that 
scientific method and analytic philosophy lead "to an unconditional avoidance 
of error in order to establish 'the truth.'" (CPR, 81) But let me disabuse him 
of this. Not only do I never advance such an idea, but I couldn't, since it is 
evident that talented scientists and philosophers would not be embroiled in 
defending incompatible theories if they possessed such miraculous methods. 
I do believe that specific methods (like Mill's) and protocols (like "if one of 
two competing theories fits the phenomena better, ceteris paribus, prefer it to 
its rival") are truth-tracking; but none so far have guaranteed what Buckland 
calls the "unconditional avoidance of error." Nor is someone who upholds the 
value of such methods committed to this view. What I am committed to is 
that such methods serve as the best (the heretofore most reliable) means for 
justifying our beliefs. But, of course, I admit that a justified belief can be 
false. 
Buckland likes to chastise science by calling it "imperialistic"--foisting its 
findings on all comers as the truth. But this is not a shortcoming of science; 
it is a reflection of Buckland's confusion of the issue of truth with the issue of 
justification. Scientific method provides us with strong justifications for things 
like theories, though, again, a well-warranted theory at time Tl could turn out 
to be false at time T2. Nevertheless, that a justified theory or belief could be 
false does not seem to loosen our expectations-of both ourselves and 
others-that we strive to back up our beliefs with the best justifications 
available. The psychoanalytic-marxist misrepresents the cognitivist as a "truth-
bully." I, for example, don't demand acceptance of my theories as infallibly 
true, but only as better justified, at this point in the debate, than their 
competitors. 
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One way in which Buckland seeks to undercut what for him are the 
dubious scientific presuppositions of cognitivism is to charge that I think of 
scientific method as a source of absolute truth and falsity. (CPR, 81) In 
contrast, Buckland thinks that relativism is the better course, and, in fact, the 
brand of relativism that he prefers is a variety of social constructivism. But 
before looking at Buckland's sketch of the social determination of scientific 
knowledge, we must consider the underlying structure of Buckland's argument. 
Buckland confronts us with a dilemma: either one must be an absolutist 
with respect to scientific knowledge or one must be a relativist; you can't be 
an absolutist (actually, for the reasons I gave above); therefore, you must be 
a relativist. 
But this argument, though it is often deployed by theorists in the 
humanities, is too facile. It has not explored all the available options. One 
can eschew absolutism and relativism at the same time. One can be what is 
called a fallibilist, which, by the way, is the position that cognitivists, like myself 
and Bordwell, hold. 
The fallibilist admits that she may have to revise her theories in light of 
future evidence or of theoretical implications of later developments because 
she realizes that at best her theories are well-warranted, and that a well-
warranted theory can be false. There is no claim to a purchase on absolute 
truth here. But neither is there a concession to relativism in any standard 
sense of the term. For we are open to revising our theories in accordance with 
the best available transcultural standards of justification, those shared, for 
example, by capitalist physicists, Chinese communist physicists, and Vatican 
physicists. 
The fallibilist denies that we could revise all our beliefs, theories, and 
protocols at once. But any subset thereof is révisable under given 
circumstances, and, indeed, the entire set might be revised serially. The 
scientific viewpoint does not commit us to the arrogant presumption that it 
delivers absolute truth, but only to the more modest claim that there are 
discernible grades of justification, of which some have proven to be more 
reliable than others. All the cognitivist need claim for her theories is that they 
are more justified, at this juncture in the dialectical debate, than are 
psychoanalytic-marxist competitors. And she may do this without claiming that 
none of her theories will ever have to be modified or abandoned. 
Of course, Buckland will deny my appeal to transcultural standards of 
justification because his version of relativism maintains that "the truth values 
of each theoretical paradigm are predominantly (although not exclusively) 
relative to the social and historical determinations from which they emerged." 
(CPR, 81) This is an empirical claim. In order to defend it, a social 
determinist like Buckland will have to demonstrate that major scientific 
claims-like the notion that gases expand when heated-have been endorsed by 
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most scientists for reasons that have almost nothing to do with evidence, 
arguments and observations, and that they have almost everything to do with 
socio-historical causes. 
No one has done this, nor does it seem very likely that it can be done, 
since it is surely a daunting fact that scientists from very different socio-
historical backgrounds (capitalist, marxist, Catholic, Islamic) accept a great 
many of the same claims (even sometimes across historical epochs). If 
Buckland were correct and scientists accepted theories not in terms of shared 
standards of enquiry but in terms of prevailing social agendas in their 
respective cultures, the fact of recurring strong consensus among scientists over 
a large number of theories could never be explained. Moreover, with 
reference to Buckland's bizarre talk about truth values, it is hard to imagine 
how one would specify the truth conditions for "gases expand when heated" in 
terms of specific constellations of socio-historical relations: "Gases expand 
when heated" is true if and only if what?—the relevant socio-historical context 
is a Protestant capitalist oligarchy! 
And, in any case, Buckland's social determinism appears at odds with his 
attempt to debunk the scientific pretensions of the cognitivist. For he wishes 
to advance the generalization that in fact all scientific claims are relative to 
social determinations. But what then is the status of his generalization? 
Presumably he wants us to regard it as either true, or approximately true, or 
well justified. But since it is an empirical generalization, his theory must be 
reflexive, i.e., it must apply to itself. And applied to itself, Buckland's 
objection reduces predominantly to an expression of the values and aims of the 
particular socio-historical situation he inhabits. So, either we will have to 
regard Buckland's view as inexplicably transcending the constraints of social 
determination (and thereby serving as a self-refutation of the theory), or we 
will have to regard his view asjust as self-deluded as he claims that cognitivism 
is. 
Conceptual relativism, augmented by a social determination thesis, then, 
is not a promising line of attack for the contemporary film theorist eager to 
undermine cognitivism. Moreover, the attractiveness of this line for politically-
minded film theorists (and literary theorists) has always been mysterious to 
me. For relativism of this sort turns progressive claims about economic 
inequality, racial oppression, and sexual bias into the special pleading of 
certain social formations. 
However, in that case, public support of the claims of reformers on the 
part of persons outside said social formations loses its point. Surely such 
reformers, a minority in every country in the industrialized West, cannot expect 
this support unless they can advance their claims as justifiable to people from 
alien social formations. Since conceptual relativism plus social determinism 
is so inimicable to the aims of political film theorists, one is tempted to explain 
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its allure for such theorists on the grounds that they think that the theory is 
probably true. But conceding that much contradicts their allegiance to a social 
constructivist epistemology. 
Buckland presumes that the cognitivist film theorists have not yet 
absorbed the lessons of post-positivist philosophers of science, viz., that 
theories should be evaluated pragmatically in a way that is sensitive to the 
contexts in which they emerge. Usually, these post-positivist insights are 
fleshed out by noting that competing scientific theories emerge in specific 
historical contexts (of theoretical debate) in order to answer presiding 
questions and that these theories are assessed pragmatically in terms of the 
way they differentially succeed in solving the contextually motivated problems. 
This mode of assessment is pragmatic (rather than absolutist) because it 
ranges only over known rival theories (rather than over every conceivable 
theory that might be brought to bear on the question), and because it focusses 
particularly on solutions to contextually motivated (theoretical) problems. But 
if this is the sort of post-positivist view of science that Buckland yearns for, 
then he fails to note that cognitivist film theory is pragmatic and 
contextual—with a vengeance. 
The entire underlying structure of Mystifying Movies is dialectical. The 
elements of cinema that I have attempted to explain, like perspective and 
narrative, have been targeted because those are the features that 
psychoanalytic-marxists have, contextually, isolated as the ones that are in need 
of explanation. Alternative cognitivist explanations are mounted and explicitly 
weighed against reigning theories in terms of their comparative justifiability. 
This approach is not positivist; it is maximally compatible with the sort of 
pragmatic, contextual sensitivity Buckland advocates, though, ironically, he does 
not recognize it as such. 
Indeed, if Mystifying Movies makes any lasting contribution to film theory, 
I would hope that it would be that it explicitly introduced the dialectical 
(pragmatic, contextually sensitive) form of argumentation to the field. 
Moreover, I also believe that I have said enough at this point to block 
dismissals of cognitivism as a naive version of positivism. In the future, 
intoning buzz phrases like "absolute knowledge" will not suffice as a way of 
rejecting cognitivism. If the debate about scientific methodology continues in 
film theory-as I think it should-then it will be constrained to begin with the 
understanding that cognitivism is prima facie based on a sophisticated, post-
positivist conception of science. 
Bashing Analytic Philosophy 
For Buckland, not only does my reliance on science as a guide to rational 
enquiry impose an imperialist, absolutist conception of "truth" on film studies; 
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my commitments to analytic philosophy reinforce this original sin. He writes: 
"Analytic philosophy presents itself as the only legitimate paradigm based on 
'true/ 'objective' knowledge. . . ." (CPR, 81) This is a strange view of analytic 
philosophy. For analytic philosophy is not a body of knowledge nor is it a 
paradigm in any strict sense of the term. It is not a paradigm because 
competing, contradictory theories can be developed under its aegis, which is 
also why it is not a body of knowledge. 
Some analytic philosophers of politics are marxists (or "Analytical 
Marxists")--like G. A. Cohen-while others are libertarians (e.g., Robert Nozick 
and Tibor Machen) and still others are liberals (e.g., John Rawls and Ronald 
Dworkin). And there are distinguished feminists, like Virginia Held, who are 
analytically inclined. Richard Wollheim advances a psychoanalytic theory of 
mind while Adolf Grunbaum and Alasdair Maclntyre reject psychoanalysis 
altogether. Analytic philosophy is a tradition rather than a paradigm or a body 
of knowledge--a tradition in which different and contradictory theories can be 
and have been developed. Thus, my allegiance to analytic philosophy in no 
way begs any questions in my debates with psychoanalytic-marxist film 
theorists. 
There is no reason to suppose that, in principle, someone might not 
defend some version of a psychoanalytic-marxist approach to film within the 
context of analytic philosophy. Therefore, there is no justification, 
methodologically, in complaining that analytic philosophy antecedently stacks 
the deck against a psychoanalytic-marxist approach in film theory. 
Of course, Buckland's reservations about analytic philosophy may spring 
from an uninformed conflation of analytic philosophy with logical positivism. 
But by this time in history, logical positivism is a defunct program, due to 
devastating objections advanced by other analytic philosophers. Moreover, 
logical positivism has been discredited for several decades. And, indeed, for 
the reasons stated in the preceding section, my approach to film theory is post-
positivist. 
Perhaps the strangest feature of Buckland's initial denunciation of the 
inherent absolutist imperialism of analytic philosophy is that throughout his 
article he relies heavily on the authority of analytical philosophers both to 
criticize me and to develop his own recommendations for film theory. Along 
the way we meet up with Donald Davidson, Hilary Putnam, W. V. Quine, 
Joseph Margolis, and J. J. Katz, while the theory of relevance that Buckland 
favors derives from the work of H. P. Grice. But these people are not 
marginal renegades; they are representatives of the core of the tradition. I 
cannot see how Buckland can reconcile his rejection of me specifically because 
of my analytic stance at the same time that he approvingly marshals so many 
once and future officers of the American Philosophical Association to rebuke 
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me. If ever one were tempted to mobilize psychoanalysis, it might be to 
explain Buckland's self-contradictory, love-hate relation to analytic philosophy. 
The Principle of Charity 
A central premise of Buckland's rejection of my arguments against 
psychoanalytic-marxist film theory is that in interpreting their commitments, 
I fail to abide by the principle of charity. (CPR, 83-84) The version of the 
principle of charity that Buckland depends upon is derived primarily from 
Donald Davidson's article "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme."4 
Davidson's principle is developed in the context of considering the problem of 
how one translates from one language to another. His principle of charity 
advises that in order to maximize the sense of the language that we are 
translating, we try to optimize agreement between ourselves and our 
interlocutors. That is, we assume that we share the bulk of our beliefs with 
the users of the alien language that we are translating. For if we can't 
formulate most of what x is saying in terms of our own conceptual scheme, we 
cannot be sure whether or not x is just making random noises. 
What Buckland wants to contend, I think, is that insofar as my 
interpretations of psychoanalytic-marxist film theorists don't respect something 
like the principle of charity (that pertains to contexts of radical translation 
between alien languages), my formulations make contemporary film theorists 
sound pretty silly. Whereas, if I extended the principle of charity to their 
theories—presuming that what I take to be reasonable corresponds to what 
they are trying to say-then their theories wouldn't appear as outlandish as I 
make them out to be. 
But I'm not sure, pace Buckland's construal of Davidson, that, even if we 
can provide a convincing version of the principle of charity, we can suppose 
that it should apply to the interpretation of theories (rather than to the 
translation of languages) in general or to my interpretation of psychoanalytic-
marxist film theory in particular. Wouldn't it be a mistake to interpret 
Aristotle's physics in terms of contemporary physical beliefs-that is, to attempt 
to find interpretations of his claims that would make as many of them as 
possible true by the lights of modern day science? Surely a principle of 
interpretation like that would produce a mass of anachronisms. 
However advisable a principle of charity might be for translating the 
ordinary speech ("There's a dog.") of alien languages, it does not follow that 
the same procedure is appropriate in reconstructing rarefied theoretical idioms, 
especially those of contesting theories. For such a policy-if carried out 
completely-would make the best interpretation of two rival theories the one 
that has them both committed to the same assertions about the relevant 
phenomena. If I extend the principle of charity to a competing theory my best 
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construal of it necessarily makes it into my theory. If one follows Buckland's 
advice fully, we wouldn't have rival theories at all. But that's absurd. 
For the preceding reasons, I am, in general, reluctant to extrapolate the 
principle of charity from the context of the radical translation of alien 
languages to the interpretation of rival theories. But I am also reluctant to 
accept the principle of charity as a policy governing my interpretation of 
contemporary film theory for another reason. Contemporary film theory is not 
an alien language for me.5 I am a user of the languages in which 
contemporary film theory is articulated. The context is not one of radical 
translation. 
The contemporary film theorist and I share the same criteria for 
identifying instances of chairs, tables, dogs, convertibles, perspective and film 
editing. We already share most of the same beliefs about the world. We may 
differ about a tiny fraction of the beliefs that make up our highly technical 
theories. But, at the same time, in virtue of all those beliefs we hold in 
common, we may be able to surmise with confidence that some of our rival's 
technical theories not only differ from ours but also actually are silly. 
It does not seem to me that Buckland is aware of the incongruities that 
result from endorsing Davidson's principle of charity as a principle of theory 
interpretation. Indeed, often it seems to me that Buckland's notion of my lack 
of charity amounts to his feeling that I am imposing alien (scientific, 
philosophical) modes of reasoning on contemporary film theory and, thereby, 
failing to interpret it from the inside. Of course, if that's what I'm doing, am 
I not charitably extending my beliefs about proof to psychoanalytic-marxist film 
theorists? But, in any case, I am not convinced that I am employing different 
forms of reasoning than contemporary film theorists do. For example, I 
recognize the kinds of arguments and standards of evidence that Buckland uses 
against me, even if I am not convinced by them. 
An example of my lack of interpretive charity, in Buckland's rather than 
Davidson's sense, which is raised more than once (CPR, 82-83; 89-90), is that 
I fail to acknowledge that contemporary film theorists stipulate or presuppose 
that movies engage the unconscious psyches of spectators. That is their 
starting point. That their theories turn out on my accounting to seem 
ridiculous is a consequence of my refusal to grant this premise.6 And 
undoubtedly psychoanalytic-marxist theory would not seem so ridiculous to me 
if I accepted this presupposition. 
However, I do not believe that a film theorist can stipulate that movies 
engage people's psyches on an unconscious level (CPR, 83) any more than I 
believe that an astrologist can be allowed to stipulate that bur fates are 
controlled by the stars. One cannot presuppose whatever one wants; one's 
presuppositions should be open to discussion and criticism. Film theory is not 
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a formal system. My refusal to accept this stipulation is a substantive issue, 
not a matter of interpretative protocols. 
Indeed, it is my conviction that the most important issue to be confronted 
in the debate between the psychoanalytic-marxist film theorist and the 
cognitivist concerns the question of whether and how the premise that 
Buckland seems to think can just be stipulated is to be defended. But more 
on that below. 
Misinterpretation I 
Due to my putative lack of intrepretive charity, Buckland maintains that 
my arguments against contemporary film theorists miss their mark because I 
am not confronting their views, but only my own misinterpretations of their 
positions. By now, given the example of Stephen Heath, misinterpretation is 
one of the canonical methods of dismissing my objections. Needless to say, I 
do not believe that my interpretations are as blind as Buckland claims. So I 
would like quickly to review some of his charges in order to unhorse them. 
At the same time, I would also like to show how very easily Buckland's "new" 
interpretations can be rejected. 
Buckland opens his rebuttal by accusing me of being uncharitable to 
Baudry^ argument in "The Apparatus." (CPR 85-88) The crux of the dispute 
is this: I take Baudry to be advancing an inductive argument by logical 
analogy which concludes that the charged experience of cinema is caused by 
the desire for and regression to primitive narcissism. Baudry reaches this 
conclusion by adducing eight basic analogies-which sometimes invoke sub-
analogies—between film and dream. I try to undermine these analogies-and 
the various sub-analogies~while also introducing some challenging disanalogies 
between film and dream. Depending on how you count them, I muster about 
ten lines of objection to Baudr/s argument, though some of these also involve 
attacking what I've just called Baudr/s sub-analogies. Where Buckland 
believes that Fve been uncharitable to Baudry Concerns the matter of one of 
Baudr/s sub-analogies. So even if Buckland were right, his worries pertain to 
roughly 8V4 percent of my arguments. 
Baudry claims that dreams and films have screens and that the so-called 
dream screen is a figure for the mother's breast. Baudry derives this "insight" 
from the psychoanalyst Bertram Lewin. I, in turn, challenge the plausibility of 
the subtending analogy between a screen and a breast, noting: 
One must at least question the purported screen/breast association. 
What is its basis? And how extensive is it? Maybe some white 
people envision breasts as white and then go on to associate the 
latter with white screens. But not everyone is white. And I wonder 
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if many whites associate breasts and screens. Certainly it is not an 
intuitively straightforward association like that between guns and 
penises. For example, screens are flat; and lactating breasts are not. 
A screen is, ideally, uniform in color and texture; but a breast has 
a nipple. (MM, 29) 
Where did I go wrong? I reject the analogy between screens and breasts 
because most breasts are not white, breasts are not uniformly colored and 
textured and because breasts are not flat. Buckland says that I'm unfair here 
because Lewin says that for a portion of one of his patient's dream her 
putative breast/dream screen was flat. So Baudry could respond to the 
flatness part of my objection by claiming that within Lewin's theory, one might 
say that breasts, in the relevant sense, are flat. 
Since Baudry never explicitly endorses this claim, I don't see how I can 
be said to have misinterpreted him. At best, one could say that I overlooked 
a possible countermove of which Baudry might avail himself upon hearing my 
objection. Was I uncharitable in failing to rehearse this countermove? Well, 
I'm not sure. Lewin's claim sounds pretty flimsy. It is not even based on an 
overt association on the part of his patient but upon an inference that Lewin, 
rather than the subject, makes regarding her description of her dream. 
Moreover, as I had already pointed out about the Lewin material (MM9 28), 
the empirical support offered for the hypothesis that all dreams have screens 
is statistically miniscule as well as being conceptually crude (we are not told 
how, in principle, to tell personal, idiosyncratic dream associations and 
structural elements of dreams, like screens, apart). Given all these problems 
with Lewin's speculation, it seems to me that I was probably exercising charity 
in not saddling Baudry with Lewin's flattened breast screens. 
Furthermore, if anyone feels that I was remiss in ignoring Lewin's 
flattened breasts, let me say what was already implicit in the charges I did 
make. If one patient can, by means of an inference, be said to associate 
flattened out breasts with screens, that would be scant evidence that all of us 
have dream screens that we associate with breasts, or even flattened breasts. 
And anyway, of course, even if Bâudry could deflect my flatness argument by 
invoking Lewin's scarcely motivated and strained speculations, that would still 
leave over ninety percent of my refutation of Baudry intact. 
In criticizing Metz's hypothesis about the role that the Imaginary plays in 
film reception, I doubted whether the phenomenon of viewing a film 
sufficiently matched canonical discussions of mirror stage identification. For 
we do not appear in the film image. Buckland criticizes me for ignoring the 
fact that authority figures like Metz and Penley assert that it is enough for the 
film to present an absent "spatial and temporal elsewhere" for the Imaginary 
to be engaged. (CPR, 89) 
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Well, I know that Metz thinks something like this; but I was asking that 
the belief be explained and justified. Buckland seems to think that I should 
accept the pronouncements of his authorities unquestioningly. I, of course, 
reject such authoritarianism on scientific grounds; I would have thought that 
it would also be unpalatable on political grounds. But, in any case, the issue 
is not one of misinterpretation. I don't misrepresent what is being claimed; I 
only require that the claim be supported by argumentation and explanation. 
A crucial aspect of my supposed misinterpretations of Metz is that I don't 
catch onto Metz's thought that all films are fictional due to their presentation 
of an absent spatial and temporal elsewhere. (CPR, 89; 91) According to 
Buckland, this oversight leads me to criticize Metz as if he were writing about 
the disavowal of conflicting beliefs and disbeliefs with respect to the presence 
of the profilmic referent of the image; whereas, for Buckland, Metz is 
discussing the presence of the diegesis. (CPR, 91) Several things need to be 
said about this. 
First, Buckland's inference from fiction in Metz's sense of diegesis is 
specious. Not all fictions are narrative. Second, Metz's contrast between a 
chair onstage and a chair on film suggests that he is talking about the play of 
absence and presence of the profilmic referent.7 Third, the contrast between 
the referent and diegesis seems spurious, since narratives refer, even if that 
reference is fictional. And finally, though I know that Metz thinks that all 
films are fictional, I have already rejected the plausibility of that claim at 
length.8 
Throughout, Buckland shows his tendency to regard my rejection of 
central premises in the arguments of contemporary film theory to be a matter 
of misinterpretation, when, in fact, they constitute substantive points in the 
debate. If someone claims that "the moon is made of green cheese" as a 
premise in a theory and I dispute this premise, I am not misinterpreting the 
theory. And, it may go without saying, I regard many of the premises of 
contemporary film theory as on a par with "the moon is made of green 
cheese." 
For Buckland, it would appear that the interpretation of a theory involves 
acceptance of the premises of the theory. This hermeneutic principle leaves 
me dumbfounded. An interpretation undoubtedly involves stating the premises 
of rival theories. But I see no reason to think that that mandates either 
believing them or treating them uncritically. 
Though Buckland is not willing to advert to my writings other than 
Mystifying Movies when supposedly they show that I am refuting rather than 
misinterpreting contemporary film theory, he will refer to those writings when 
putatively they reveal my chronic inability to interpret people correctly. For 
example, he cites my discussion of certain illusion theories of representation 
in "Conspiracy Theories of Representation"9 in order to declare that one of its 
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arguments fails to apply to Metz and Baudry. But why is this a problem, since 
the article is not about Metz and Baudry? 
Certainly Buckland is right in noting (CPR, 90) that both Metz and I 
agree that film viewers know that they are watching films. However, that is 
not the issue that is under dispute. Rather the issue is whether or not this 
needs to be explained in terms of a notion of disavowal. And I, of course, try 
to argue that commitments to disavowal are extraneous. 
In recounting my debate with Stephen Heath on the status of perspective 
(CPR, 93), Buckland suggests that my emphasis on the biological and 
perceptual aspects of perspective renderings precludes the fact that perspective 
has a history and, therefore, a conventionalist status. Of course, I never deny 
that perspective has a history; people write books about it, and I have read 
them. But this concession hardly implies that perspective is merely a 
convention in the sense defended by conventionalists like Goodman and 
Wartofsky in the philosophical and psychological literature. Indeed, I would 
even be willing to grant that there are some conventions within the tradition 
of perspective rendering (e.g., that the most significant elements in the 
rendering be placed at the vanishing point). But this does not compel me to 
accept the idea that perspective works solely in virtue of conventions. 
Buckland also chides me for my interpretation of contemporary film 
theory's treatment of perspective because I do not foreground their supposed 
discovery that perspective is really a representation of a metaphysical 
position—such as Husserlian Idealism—with religious overtones. (CPR, 92) 
This is not quite right, for I do dismiss one variation on this theme, viz., 
Comolli's. (MM 137-138) However, Buckland is correct in observing that I do 
not deal with the version of the thesis propounded in Jean-Louis Baudry^ 
"Ideological Effects of the Basic Cinematographic Apparatus." 
The reason that I did not pause to dismiss Baudry^ correlation of the 
cinematic apparatus with Husserlian Idealism was that I thought that the 
argument was evidently flawed. For Baudry seems to find that the apparatus 
reflects Husserlian Idealism on the basis of the same features that in his article 
"The Apparatus" he correlated cinema with Platonism. But Husserlian 
Idealism and Platonism are incompatible philosophical positions. How can 
cinema represent two incompatible philosophical positions in virtue of the self-
same features? The fact that Baudry discovers that cinema represents 
Idealism as easily as he discovers that it represents its Platonic antipode 
suggests to me that the "apparatus" underdetermines what philosophical 
theories can be associated with it. And this, furthermore, suggests to me that 
we would be better off dropping the idea that cinema as such is a 
representation of a specific philosophical or religious position altogether. 
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Buckland's accusation of my 
systematic misinterpretation of contemporary film theory is his explicit refusal 
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to commit himself to the tenets of contemporary film theory once they have 
been interpreted accurately (i.e., à la Buckland). (CPR, 87) Basically, 
Buckland seems to be arguing that, though I'm wrong due to my biased 
interpretations, he, Buckland, is not prepared to say that contemporary film 
theory, when correctly interpreted, is viable. Moreover, when one realizes that 
the positive theoretical recommendations that Buckland makes at the end of 
his article (CPR, 102-103) are basically cognitivist, one begins to suspect that 
the "Critique of Poor Reason" is "pulling a fast one" on the reader. That is, 
Buckland really wants to be "more cognitivist than thou" (or me), and the 
vociferous complaints about my misinterpretations are camouflage. Screen 
beware: Buckland may be a cognitivist in psychoanalytic clothing. 
Misinterpretation II 
If Buckland is convinced that I systematically misread contemporary film 
theory, I am equally sure that Buckland misreads me. I don't think that this 
is a lack of Davidsonian charity. He simply doesn't take note of the words on 
my pages. 
In reviewing my positive proposals about the nature of our perception of 
the cinematic image, Buckland complains that I reduce the image to the status 
of a natural object. (CPR, 97) This just ignores my contention that we should 
conceptualize picturing (including motion picturing) as cultural inventions. 
(MM, 142-145) 
Also, Buckland infers that I am attracted to the hypothesis that pictures 
are universally recognizable because this entails that pictures have no 
ideological repercussions. But before this debunking account of my scurrilous 
motives for embracing the hypothesis is accepted, one should consider all the 
psychological data I advance in favor of the hypothesis. I'm not championing 
the view because I have a covert political agenda. I feel drawn to the 
hypothesis because of the psychological evidence. (MM, 139-142) 
Buckland also maintains that my theory of cinematic perception is 
inconsistent. For, on the one hand, I claim that when perceiving a cinematic 
image we are focally aware of what it is about and subsidiarily aware that it 
is a representation. But when I offer my characterization of cinematic 
awareness, Buckland claims that I place "exclusive emphasis upon the focus in 
which the subsidiaries are marginalised out of the picture (literally!)." (CPR, 
97) 
This is not so much a misinterpretation as a misreading. It ignores 
sentences like: "Human perceptual capacities evolve in such a way that the 
capacity for pictorial recognition comes, almost naturally, with the capacity for 
object recognition, and part of that capacity is the ability to differentiate 
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pictures from their referents." (MM, 144) This, of course, acknowledges that 
subsidiary awareness of the picture is part and parcel of all picture perception. 
On the other hand, if what worries Buckland is that I think that what he 
calls the focus commands more of our attention than the subsidiary, he has 
read me correctly. I do think that the focus generally carries more weight. 
That's what it means to be the focus rather than the subsidiary. Or, 
alternatively, what's the problem with marginalizing the subsidiary, since the 
subsidiary is, by a definition Buckland seems to accept, relatively marginalized? 
Buckland criticizes my positive account of cinematic narration on the 
grounds that it ignores the possibility of the subversion of hypotheses a film 
induces its audience to formulate. But in my account of what I call a 
sustaining scene, I, for example, explicitly state: "A scene that begins to answer 
a narrative question but then frustrates the answer-e.g., a detective following 
up a wrong clue—is also a sustaining scene." (MM, 174-175) Moreover, 
Buckland's exploration of this supposed lacuna in my view, specifically with 
reference to horror films, is dealt with more thoroughly in my book The 
Philosophy of Horror.10 
Buckland thinks that there is a fundamental problem with my positive 
account of cinematic comprehension: it is what he calls code/semantic rather 
than pragmatic. (CPR, 100) In contrast, I think Buckland is mistaken in 
characterizing my theory this way; moreover, I suspect that the origin of 
Buckland's confusion is that he has taken parts of the theory to be the whole 
of the theory. 
As I understand him, my theory is supposedly a code/semantic theory 
because it treats cinematic comprehension as if it were "automatic." And I 
suppose that, were cinematic comprehension simply a matter of decoding, one 
might call it automatic. But two things require emphasis here. First, I do not 
maintain that film comprehension as a whole is automatic, though I think 
certain aspects of it may be "virtually automatic," viz., that we are looking 
where we are looking in a close shot in virtue of the framing, and that we 
recognize what images are about in virtue of innate perceptual capacities. The 
latter claim may be controversial, though I think the psychological evidence is 
on my side, while the former claim is I think incontestable. Moreover, I do 
not reduce cinematic comprehension to these two processes, but go on to 
stress the importance of hypothesis formation in my account of erotetic~or 
question/answer-narration in a way that is more a matter of what Buckland 
would call a pragmatic theory. Thus, though there are elements of automatism 
in my theory, the theory as a whole puts a great deal of emphasis on the kind 
of pragmatic approach Buckland endorses. 
Second, even if aspects of my account of cinematic comprehension are 
automatic, they are not automatic in virtue of some code. That I am looking 
at the heroine's face in a close shot is not a function of an arbitrarily 
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established code. The perceptual structure of the image, typically, causes one 
to be looking where one is looking. Similarly, I advance a number of 
considerations in order to deny that our processing of the cinematic image 
involves decoding. Thus, not only is my theory as a whole not a semantic/code 
theory, but even the parts of it that regard some features of cinematic 
comprehension as "automatic" do not rely on codes. Therefore, I am not a 
code/semantic theorist. Indeed, throughout my career as a film theorist, I 
have always explicitly stressed the importance of inference over decoding as a 
model for cinematic comprehension.11 
Furthermore, once it is clear that I am not a code/semantic theorist, the 
significance of Buckland's pragmatic alternative to my approach loses its 
dialectical force. For the choice between Buckland/Sperber/Wilson and 
Carroll cannot be decided on the basis of superiority of pragmatic/relevance 
theories versus semantic/code theories. Moreover, though it is somewhat 
difficult to make out Buckland's positive recommendations for film 
theorists—given his clotted, programmatic style of writing-I suspect that my 
theory of cinematic comprehension is probably compatible with the sort 
Buckland advocates (that is, if Buckland's view makes sense). 
Buckland also bandies about the charge—frequently leveled at cognitivist 
theorists—that I am a formalist (e.g., CPR, 100). This overlooks the fact that 
not only do I discuss the use of certain structures in terms of their ideological 
significance (e.g., MM 158,159) but I explicitly promise that cognitivism can 
offer piecemeal generalizations about the operation of ideology in film. 
Similarly, though Bordwell is generally upbraided as a formalist, I can think of 
few studies as dedicated as his of Ozu to situating his subject so thoroughly in 
terms of its socio-political context.12 
Of course, Buckland is right in noticing that most of the theories that are 
proposed in Mystifying Movies are what he would call formalist. But that is 
only to say that I believe that some of our questions of cinema may require 
what he calls formalist answers. However, I have never precluded the 
possibility that other questions must confront the issue of ideology. Indeed, 
in recent papers, I have attempted to extend the cognitivist approach to issues 
of film ideology.13 Thus, the real issue is not whether cognitivism is formalist, 
but whether the contribution that cognitivism can make to what I take to be 
legitimate questions about film and ideology is productive or not. Specifically, 
we will need to compare the merits of cognitivist models of film ideology to 
psychoanalytic models. 
Cognitivism is not a fully developed theory. It is an approach that has 
guided some theorizing already and which, it is to be hoped, will guide more 
in the future. I have always agreed that some of this theorizing will pertain to 
the ideological and political dimension of cinema. In that sense, I have never 
been a formalist. Moreover, since cognitivist theories of these topics are 
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beginning to be produced, charges of formalism are obsolete. The issue now 
is whether cognitivist or psychoanalytic theories do a better job answering our 
questions about ideology. This discussion has barely begun; nevertheless, I 
welcome it. 
Cognitivism, Psychoanalysis and Constraint: The Big Question 
Perhaps Buckland's central objection to my approach is that I will only 
countenance or regard as valid theories of film that are cognitivist. (CPR, 96) 
In this way, Buckland distinguishes between the good cognitivist cop, Bordwell, 
and the bad cognitivist cop, me. But, in fact, I have never denied that 
psychoanalysis might contribute to our understanding of film. I wrote: 
Nothing we have said suggests an objection in principle to these 
more specific questions about aspects of the audience over and 
above their cognitive faculties. Social conditioning and affective 
psychology, appropriately constrained, might be introduced to 
explain the power of given movies or types of movies for target 
groups. Sociology, anthropology, and certain forms of 
psychoanalysis are likely to be useful in such investigations. (MM, 
213) 
Perhaps these qualifications, and similar ones in my book The Philosophy 
of Horror, have been overlooked by readers because of my protracted, 
admittedly relentless rejection of one psychoanalytic hypothesis after another. 
But I have consistently acknowledged that apart from the specific arguments 
that I have advanced against specific applications of psychoanalytic theories, 
I have no knock-down argument to show that psychoanalysis is always out of 
place in film theory. Indeed, as the preceding passage indicates, I explicitly 
allow that, appropriately constrained, psychoanalysis may add to our 
understanding of film. 
Of course, the sticking point here is whatever is meant by "appropriately 
constrained." Indeed, I think that the continued debate between cognitivism 
and psychoanalysis hinges on discussing and debating the kinds of constraints 
that film theorists should respect when applying psychoanalysis to film. In 
order to advance this debate, allow me to state my view. 
In thinking about when it is appropriate to embrace psychoanalytic 
explanatory frameworks, it pays to remember that psychoanalysis is a theory 
that is designed to explain the irrational. Thus, behavior that can be traced 
without remainder to organic sources, such as brain lesions and chemical 
imbalances, are not in the domain of psychoanalysis. For they are nonrational 
causes, not irrational ones. Similarly, behaviors-like certain slips of the tongue 
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of the sorts translators and transcribers make—which can be attributed to 
limitations of standard cognitive processing are also analyzable in terms of 
nonrational and not irrational causes, and, therefore, are not proper objects of 
psychoanalysis. Likewise, behaviors, states, or reactions that are explicable 
rationally and/or in virtue of normal cognitive processing are not, prima facie, 
appropriate topics for psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis explains breakdowns in 
rationality or in normal cognitive processing that are not otherwise explicable 
in terms of nonrational defects. 
Another way to put this is to ask what remains to be explained if we can 
account for a behavior or a state in terms of rational psychology or in terms 
of nonrational defects in the organism or processing system. That is, in order 
to mobilize psychoanalysis, one has to be able to point to some data which are 
not sufficiently explained by rational (under which rubric I would include many 
cultural practices), organic or systemic factors. 
Freud himself abides by this methodological constraint in his 
Interpretation of Dreams
 y where he first, and at great length, disposes of dream 
theories of the preceding sorts before advancing his own theory. Moreover, 
I would contend that he was motivated here by more than respect for the 
niceties of dialectical argumentation. He realized that in order to postulate the 
operation of repressed unconscious forces he had to demonstrate the failure 
to accomodate the data of rationalist psychology, standing accounts of cognitive 
processing, and organic hypotheses. For it is analytical to the very concept of 
psychoanalysis that its object is the irrational, which domain has as its criterion 
of identification the inadequacy of rational, cognitive or organic explanations. 
Put bluntly, there is nothing left for psychoanalysis to explain if the behavior 
or state in question can be explained organically, rationally or in terms of the 
normal functioning of our cognitive and perceptual systems. 
The relevance of this to the dialectical structure of argumentation in 
Mystifying Movies should be obvious. First I criticize various psychoanalytic 
explanations of our responses to cinema in terms of their logical and empirical 
flaws. Then I field a rival hypothesis which I argue is not logically flawed, and 
which I argue does a better job with the data. In other words, I put theories 
in competition. 
However, there is a feature of this dialectical strategy that is not standard 
in most other scientific debates. For the theories that I advance in competition 
to psychoanalysis are all what we call cognitivist. Thus, if they are convincing 
and if psychoanalytic theory is constrained in the way I argue, then my theories 
not only challenge psychoanalytic alternatives, but preclude them. For they 
show that the responses in question are not in the appropriate domain of 
psychoanalysis.14 
Of course, I don't suppose that this ends the discussion. Confronted with 
this strategy, the critic disposed toward psychoanalysis will want to find some 
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aspect of the data that my theories do not explain. But if this is the structure 
of the debate between cognitivism and psychoanalysis, then it indicates that 
Mystifying Movies has achieved at least one effect. Namely, it has shifted the 
burden of proof to the defender of psychoanalysis. The underlying purpose of 
Mystifying Movies and of my recent cognitivist account of horror has been to 
shift the burden of proof to the psychoanalytic film theorist. Indeed, I chose 
the horror genre as an arena in which to expand cognitivist theorizing just 
because its traffic with intense emotional states gives it the appearance of 
being, so to speak, a "natural" target for psychoanalysis. It is now up to the 
psychoanalyst to show what my theories of horror, cinematic narration, 
cinematic representation, editing and film music have left out and to show that 
in order to account for this remainder we must resort to suitably constrained 
psychoanalytic explanations-rather than cognitivist or biological or socio-
cultural alternatives. 
Again, I have no argument to show that there is nothing left over for 
psychoanalytic theorists and critics to explain. What I think I have shown is 
rather: first, that there is less to be explained than is usually presumed, 
without argument, by contemporary film theorists and, second, that the burden 
of proof in the debates I have initiated is theirs. Maybe there are aspects of 
our response to cinema that call for suitably constrained psychoanalytic 
theorizing. My position is that it now up to psychoanalytic critics to prove it. 
They cannot, as Buckland proposes, simply stipulate it. 
On the one hand, I am a methodological pluralist in the sense that I favor 
having a field where there are a lot of theories. For insofar as putting all our 
available theories into competition delivers results, putting a lot of theories 
into play is likely to be productive. But I am a robust methodological pluralist 
since I am not advocating a situation in which everyone just rattles around in 
their own paradigm. Instead, the available theories should be critically 
compared in such a way that some may be eliminated, though critical 
comparison may also reveal that some of these theories are complementary or 
supplementary or otherwise compatible. Unlike Buckland, I am not ready now 
to suppose that cognitivism and some form of psychoanalysis are obviously 
compatible. But neither am I committed to the view that this is an impossible 
conclusion. At present, my bets are clearly on cognitivism. Yet I have always 
conceded that only time and critical, reflective debate will settle the issue. 
I admit that I know no reason in principle to predict that psycho-analysis 
will never provide the most satisfactory explanations of some of the data at 
hand. All we can do is compare the relative strengths and weaknesses of our 
theories. This, of course, also requires that we interrogate the framework in 
which we compare our theories. Questions about whether there are 
constraints to which psychoanalysis is beholden and about what these 
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constraints are constitute the fundamental issue between psychoanalytic film 
theorists and their cognitivist counterparts today. Let the discussion begin. 
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